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ARCTIC 
“Punch” Dickins and  the Origin of Canol’s 
Mackenzie Air Fields 
P. S. BARRY’ 
Correspondence between the Canadian flyer, C. H. “Punch” Dickins, and 
government officials in Ottawa during the early summer of 1942 reveals that 
the United States Army  began  building an  “unauthorized” military air  route 
to Norman Wells (Fig. 1) much earlier than the U.S. War Department’s 
official histories admit, and that, although Canada’s Cabinet War Committee 
professedly knew  nothing of it,  certain Canadian government personnel were 
privy to  the  secret. 
In a note to the American ambassador dated 17 September 1942 Hugh 
Keenleyside, Canadian Assistant Under Secretary of State,  requested 
information regarding rumours that  the  U.S. Army Engineers “intended” to 
operate and maintain a chain of airports for wheeled aircraft from Fort 
McMurray to Norman Wells to assist the moving of freight for the Canol 
Project, a wartime scheme to pipe crude oil from Norman Wells to a new 
refinery in Whitehorse on  the  Northwest Staging Route  to Alaska. 
Keenleyside pointed out  that diplomatic agreements of 27 and 29 June 1942 
covering Canol had not provided for airports in the Mackenzie Valley, nor 
had the Government of Canada been asked  for permission to build them.  The 
American ambassador, Pierrepont Moffat, answered on 5 October that the 
Army Engineers did indeed “contemplate”  the  construction of landing strips, 
and he  expressed  the  hope  that Canadian authorities would concur in 
interpreting the Canol agreements as encompassing “essential supply lines 
and other means of communications” for the pipeline project (Clark, 1943; 
Keenleyside, 1943). Two days later (7 October 1942) the War Committee of 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s Cabinet took official note of “certain 
projects  put in hand without reference  to  Canada,” including seven of Canol’s 
airports  (Foster, 1943 a).  The Canadian government thus appears  to have been 
surprised to discover  that  he  airports already existed  (Dziuban, 1960; 
Diubaldo, 1977). 
The Canol Project grew out of the lobbying efforts of the  Arctic  explorer, 
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, who for some years had been fascinated by  oil 
prospects in the Mackenzie Valley, and was  urging military and civilian 
authorities  in Washington to  tap  the petroleum resources of Imperial Oil Ltd. 
(Standard Oil  of  New Jersey, now Exxon  Corp.) at Norman Wells for  defence 
purposes (Finnie, 1943, 1945; Ralph, 1943). The exploitation of Norman oil 
became a  serious proposition when the  Japanese  attacked Pearl Harbor  on 7 
December 1941, provoking the U.S.A.’s declaration of war. A rush of 
Alaska-bound air traffic overwhelmed the Northwest Staging Route, which 
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I FIG. 1 .  Northwestern Canada, showing the Canol Project air fields (Mackenzie Air Route) listed 
by “Punch”  Dickins, 15 June 1942. 
would soon be further congested as the U.S. Air Force Ferrying Command 
began deliveries of war  planes to Russia via Fairbanks (Dziuban, 1960). This 
situation persuaded American  military authorities to build the Alaska Military 
Highway  linking the Staging Route aerodromes, and to install a pipeline 
through the  Mackenzie Mountains to bring  oil  from Norman Wells to 
Whitehorse. Because of the supposed  enemy threat to tanker ships plying the 
Inland Passage to Alaska, the U.S. Army chiefs considered the Norman oil 
field a safer source of fuel for the northwest defence apparatus than the 
Pacific Coast refineries, the normal source of Alaska’s fuel (Finnie, 1943, 
1945; Hopkins, 1943; Dziuban, 1960. Cf. Lloyd, 1944; Conn and Fairchild, 
1960). 
The  Mackenzie oil scheme quickly took Shape  during  April 1942 under the 
name of Canadian American Norman Oil’ Line, the basis of the acronym 
Canol, often explained as a combination of “Canada”  and “oil” (M. Zubko, 
Aklavik  Flying Service, personal communication. Cf. Hopkins, 1943; 
Dziuban, 1960; Gray, 1970; Diubaldo, 1977; Woodman, 1978). The Canol 
Project was the first major intrusion of industrial age activities into the 
Mackenzie District since commercial whaling collapsed in 1911; its effects 
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were felt  all the way to the Arctic coast. According to the Canadian economist 
Robert Leggett, at least $300 million (1942 monetary values) were expended 
on Canol by the time U.S. forces were withdrawn from the region in 1945 
(Barry, 1974, 1976). 
In its haste to develop the oil field at Norman the U.S. War Department 
issued orders for drilling  wells  and constructing the pipeline and refinery on 29 
April 1942, and was signing contracts for the work on 1 May, before the 
Government of Canada had been officially approached for approval of the 
project (Finnie, 1945; Dziuban, 1960; Stacey, 1970). The Mackenzie Valley 
airports were among the more than 40 subsidiary projects of Canol that were 
initiated  without  prior arrangements with Ottawa and had to be authorized ex 
postfixto (Barry, 1977). 
Conventional  histories of Canol, many of them based on information 
released by  the U.S. War Department during  World  War Two, generally agree 
that the U.S. Army Engineers began installing airports in the Mackenzie 
country late in the summer of 1942 as an emergency measure when the 
congestion of freight on the Athabaska-Mackenzie waterway prevented 
completion of the Norman pipeline by the War Department’s deadline of 1 
October 1942. Without seeking Canadian approval, it is said, the Americans 
hastily cleared landing  strips to allow the pipeline’s  freight to move north after 
fall freeze-up (Finnie, 1943, 1945; Lloyd, 1944; Dziuban, 1960; Barry, 1976). 
The documents presented here refute this version of the start of airport 
construction in the Mackenzie, showing that  the American  military  decided to 
build the airports much sooner than has been thought, and, furthermore, that 
certain Canadian government personnel knew about these plans  shortly after 
Canol started up. 
The situation of commercial  aviation  in northwestern Canada leading  up to 
the Dickins letters is worth summarizing. Except for a neglected 3,500-foot 
(1066.8 m) strip at Fort Resolution  owned  by Canada’s Forestry Branch, no 
permanent all-season  landing  fields for wheeled aircraft existed in the 
Mackenzie  District before the advent of Canol (Urquhart, 1942). Fort 
McMurray  was the change-over base for pontoon and ski  planes  operating  in 
the Mackenzie where air service halted twice a year during freeze-up and 
break-up (G. G.  Latham, Eldorado Aviation Ltd., personal communication). 
The nearest facilities for wheel  planes were at Peace River, Alberta, 260 air 
miles (421.6 km) to the west, which had possessed an air field since 1921 
(Wilson, 1943; Ellis, 1961). But scheduled flights to and from Peace River  had 
ceased by 1941, its passenger service handled by special arrangements with 
the  Grande Prairie  office of Grant W. G. McConachie’s  Yukon Southern Air 
Transport Ltd. (G. Paul, secretary-treasurer, Town  of Peace River, personal 
communication). That year,  Grande Prairie had become an important point on 
the Northwest Staging Route, the military  name  for the McConachie “Great 
Circle Route” to Alaska (Foster, 1943 b; Keith, 1972). When the U.S. War 
Department began the Canol Project, Canada’s Department of Transport was 
still  building  Staging Route aerodromes at Grande Prairie, Fort  St.  John,  Fort 
Nelson, Watson Lake, and Whitehorse, although the U.S. Army Air Force 
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and its contractors had been flying the  route, with Canada’s permission,  for 
several months (Dziuban, 1960). 
On 16 May 1942, coincident with the arrival of Canol’s task force in 
Edmonton, Canadian Pacific Railways  merged ten of the  western flying 
companies in which it had been gradually acquiring controlling interest.  The 
companies included Yukon Southern, which the CPR  had taken over in 
January 1941 when the DOT was  organizing construction of the Staging 
Route.  The result of the merger was Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd., which 
commanded the  services of the  best pilots and air  technicians in the Canadian 
northwest (Keith, 1972; Canadian Pacific Air Lines, 1977; Chorley, 1977). 
“Punch” Dickins, who had been the first pilot to fly the Canadian Barren 
Lands and the  first  o fly the Mackenzie route  to  the  Arctic, became 
vice-president and general manager, while the popular McConachie, later  CP 
Air’s president, became manager of the western lines. To accommodate its 
new subsidiary CPR appropriated funds for airports at Fort McMurray and 
Fort Smith (Keith, 1972). These moves lie behind Dickins’s exchange of 
letters with Canadian government officials  in June  and July 1942. 
Dickins had spent several weeks at the time of the amalgamation visiting 
the new company’s western  department and negotiating contracts  for  CP Air 
with Bechtel-Price-Callahan of San  Francisco,  the prime construction 
contractor to the U.S. Army for Canol. Back in Montreal on 15 June he wrote 
to R. A. Gibson, Deputy Commissioner of the Northwest Territories and 
Director of Lands, Parks, and Forestry Branch, Department of Mines and 
Resources, enlisting support for the Mackenzie airports: 
I have just returned from a long trip to  the West during which I 
concluded arrangements with a firm of contractors who are building an oil 
pipeline for  the United States Army from Fort Norman [sic] to 
Whitehorse. This firm is an association of American contracting firms, 
with headquarters in San  Francisco. 
During the course of construction they will require extensive air 
transportation  services and it is their  intention to have a daily schedule 
4 between Edmonton and Norman Wells. To  do  this without interruption  at
break-up and freeze-up will require  the  construction of landing strips at 
Fort  Smith,  Providence, Simpson, Norman Wells,  with emergency 
The firm  is prepared to construct  these landing strips and to bear 
the whole cost of same, including  small buildings, radio equipment,  etc. I 
have discussed the matter fully with Mr. J. A. Wilson and Mr. A. D. 
McLean,  and they have agreed to send one of their  airport engineers to 
look over  the  sites  selected by our Mr. [Matt] Berry, who  is on loan to  the 
American contractor  for  the purpose of watching airfield construction. 
Mr. Berry,  the  Department  engineers, and the  representative of the 
construction company will be in close touch with Mr. Meikle at Fort 
Smith,  and they will be  providing him with  all the information relative to 
the final sites selected from time to time. 
d landing strips at Resolution and Wrigley. 
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We appreciate  very much the co-operation that we have received 
from  your  representatives in the  North West Territories,  and  we hope that 
this project will materialize, as it will undoubtedly prove of very lasting 
benefit to the people of the North Country, since it will enable air 
operations to be carried on on a year-round basis without interruption 
along the main route (Dickins, 1942 a). 
The combination of this letter’s early date with plans for permanent air 
fields scotches  the  idea  that  the U.S. Army began clearing air strips toward 
the end of Canol’s first summer to meet a “freighting emergency” as fall 
approached and work on  the Norman-Whitehorse  pipeline had not  yet begun. 
As it  happened,  the pipeline  work between  the Mackenzie and  the Yukon  did 
not commence in earnest until late the following summer (1943) when it 
became  clear  that  the Truman  Committee of the U.S. Senate would soon  be 
harassing Army authorities in  public  hearings  critical of defence expenditures 
for  the Canol Project (Foster, 1943 c; Truman Committee, 1944). The 
Norman-Whitehorse crude oil line was hastily pushed through, with crews 
working from east and west, during the fall and winter of 1943-1944. The 
577-mile  (924.9  km)  4- and 6-inch  (10.2 cm and 15.2 cm) pipeline  was “tied  in” 
at MacMillan Pass on 16 February 1944, but delivered no  oil into Whitehorse 
until three months later when the new refinery was finally completed. Until 
then, traffk on  the  Northwest Staging Route  and  the Alaska Highway  relied 
on gasoline carried by tanker ship to Prince Rupert,  B.C.,  and trans-shipped 
in  barges to Skagway, Alaska, and which a second Canol pipeline, completed 
by late December  1942, conveyed to Whitehorse (Finnie, 1945; Dziuban, 
1960). Within a year, two extensions of this autonomous Skagway pipeline, 
sponsored by U.S.  Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes and  Standard Oil  of 
California, were laid along the Alaska Highway to  carry Pacific coast gasoline 
east to Watson Lake on the Staging Route and northwest to Fairbanks 
(Diubaldo, 1977; Barry, 1979). So carelessly was the Norman line put 
together, and so casual was its maintenance during its 11 months of operation 
that, of the approximately one million barrels of crude oil eventually pumped 
through it from the Mackenzie, 14 percent was lost in breaks and spills 
(Hemstock, 1945). In view  of these circumstances it  is difficult to establish a 
close  connection between the installation of the Mackenzie air fields and  the 
reported panic to complete the Norman  pipeline  by the early autumn of  1942. 
“Punch” Dickins’s information that the U.S. Army and its contractors 
were planning the Mackenzie Airports during  Canol’s first weeks also clarifies 
an obscure item in the reports of Major General W. W. Foster, Canada’s 
Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in the North-West, who a year 
after Canol began  was assigned by the Cabinet War  Committee to determine 
precisely the details of  American activities in the region. General Foster gives 
the  date of first  construction  on  the Mackenzie air  route as 15  May  1942, the 
day before CP Air  was formed,  and  the  day  the War  Committee  met in Ottawa 
to consider the proposal for the Canol Project, which, of course, did not 
mention any air fields or the supplementary pipelines reaching inland from 
Skagway (Foster, 1943 d). 
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Still more  remarkable is the  evidence  the  letter offers that knowledgeable 
officials of at least two Canadian government  departments knew  of plans for 
the “unauthorized” air fields months before the War Committee as a body 
expressed knowledge of them. In particular, McLean, the DOT’S former 
Superintendent of Airways, who had become Controller of Civil Aviation 
after  a  tour of duty  as  a  Squadron  Leader with the Royal Canadian Air Force, 
was thoroughly familiar with aviation developments in the west (Dziuban, 
1960; Ellis, 1961). It is significant, moreover,  that in 1950 CP Air held records 
of government inspections made “in  the early spring of 1942” of air field sites 
at  Fort McMurray, Fort  Smith, and Fort  Resolution, according to an official 
Canadian Pacific Railway Company history  (Bonar, 1950). 
Work on  the  airports must have proceeded rapidly, for  a week after Dickins 
wrote to Gibson, Controller McLean was writing to Dickins (22 June 1942) 
from Ottawa asking about construction proceeding at Fort Smith without 
DOT supervision. Dickins’s cautious reply of 28 June offers no information 
about  he Army’s and Bechtel-Price-Callahan’s work on  the  airport;  he 
explains only what CP Air  had been doing in the way of construction: 
. . . men and  equipment were idle at Fort Smith awaiting a visit from the 
Department’s Inspector, and as time is  the primary factor in the 
development of the landing fields and in the completion of the job for 
which they are being built, it was decided, after a conference of  all 
government officials available, that the location chosen was practically 
the only suitable site and the preliminary clearing of some trees and 
underbrush was started  (Dickins, 1942 b). 
He  requests  that  an  inspector and an engineer be assigned to  the Mackenzie 
District permanently so that  “work  can  proceed at three  or  four places at the 
same time.” He emphasizes that the Canol contractors “are absorbing the 
whole cost of the  fields,” which will be  “usable and satisfactory  for 
wheel-equipped aircraft of 25,000 pounds [ 11,339.8 kg] gross  weight,”  that  is, 
more  than  twelve  tons  loaded. 
On 3 July McLean  answered Dickins rather apologetically, saying that  “our 
only interest in the matter is to assist wherever possible.” He hopes for 
advance notice of the need for engineers because he is unable to assign 
anyone to continuous  duty in the Mackenzie District (McLean, 1942). 
More than two months then passed before  External Affairs began feeling 
out  he U.S. about  he Mackenzie airports,  apparently  after Canadian 
politicians had been alerted through military channels. The Cabinet War 
Committee took note on 14 October 1942 that all the  “unauthorized” works of 
the U.S. Army that it was called upon to approve retroactively that day, 
including Canol’s air fields, had been drawn  to  their  attention in the  first place 
by the  Interdepartmental Panel on  Joint Defence Construction  Projects, 
through which passed memoranda prepared by military aides for Canadian 
Chiefs of Staff (Foster, 1943 a). 
By the  end of the Canol Project’s first  year  the U.S. Army  had installed at 
least twelve airports or landing strips that could be considered part of the 
Mackenzie Air Route,  and  were considering installing still more. A full 
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account of the location and  construction of these  air facilities has not yet been 
published. 
Besides establishing an earlier date  than  has  been  accepted  for  the origin  of 
the ‘Mackenzie air fields, the Dickins correspondence raises many interesting 
questions. What role did the CP Air merger play in the “unauthorized” 
installation of the Mackenzie  Valley airports,  and what  w s
Bechtel-Price-Callahan’s part in starting construction without approaching 
Canada through regular channels? Was the construction of permanent air 
fields in the Mackenzie country related in some way to the U.S. Army’s 
claims of a 150 million-barrel “bonanza” at Imperial Oil’s Norman oil field 
(Barry, 1977, 1979) and to the failure to complete the Norman-Whitehorse 
pipeline until 1944? Finally, was C. D. Howe, as Minister of Transport and 
dominating  member  of the War  Committee (Stacey, 1970), the pivotal figure in 
Canada’s ambivalent policy  regarding airports in the Mackenzie? The 
answers, if there  are  any, require a further  search of the  once “classified” 
government and military documents pertaining to Canol. 
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